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Inquality and the Future of Global History:  
A Round Table Discussion
Abstract 
The following is an edited transcript of a roundtable that took place at the 
University of Glasgow in September 2018. The roundtable was organized by 
Dr. Julia McClure in conjunction with the Poverty Research Network’s confer-
ence - Beyond Development: The Local Visions of Global Poverty. That con-
ference brought into focus the ways in which the global and local levels meet 
at the site of poverty and highlighted the different conceptions on the global 
are generated from the perspective of poverty. The roundtable brought togeth-
er leading scholars from Europe, Africa, Asia and North and South America 
to take stock of global history as a field, to consider the role of existing centres 
of knowledge production, and to assess new directions for the field. 
Panellists
Amitava Chowdhury – Associate Professor, Queens University, Canada
Sarah Easterby-Smith – Senior Lecturer, University of St Andrews, UK
Norberto Ferreras – Associate Professor, Universidade Federal Fluminense, Brazil
Omar Gueye – Professor, Cheikh Anta Diop Université, Senegal
Andrew MacKillop – Senior Lecturer, University of Glasgow, UK
Meha Priyadarshini – Lecturer, University of Edinburgh, UK 
Steven Serels – Research Officer, Martin Luther Universitӓt Hall-Wittenberg, Germany  
Jelmer Vos – Lecturer, University of Glasgow, UK
Moderator
Julia McClure – Lecturer, University of Glasgow, UK
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Introductory Remarks
Julia McClure: 
Since its emergence as a distinct field in the 1980s, global history has often focused 
upon macro-economic analysis and the emergence of interdependent global financial 
systems. Global historians have examined the flow of capital and commodities or the 
material culture of luxury and art as tangible traces of global connections. Poverty, often 
defined in relation to the lack of money, resources, and luxury goods, presents itself 
as a kind of historiographical antithesis to global history. Poverty has been in global 
history’s blind spot. Poverty has been seen, if at all, as an unfortunate bi-product of global 
processes. Yet poverty is not only a consequence of global connections but has also been 
a productive force. Poverty is essential to the fabric of connectivity and poverty has been 
essential to the projects of world making. 
The 2013 publication of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty First Century 
caused a seismic shift in the social sciences, putting inequality firmly back on academics’ 
research agenda.1 For historians of race, gender, and capital, inequality has always been 
central, yet the recent ‘inequality turn’ opens up new directions for thinking about inequality 
that are still to be fully realised in the field of global history. Focusing on inequality gives 
us a new way to conceptualise connectivities, to think of the frictions, and to problematize 
some of the normative assumptions around the framework of connections. The focus on 
inequality is tied to the environmental turn, our understandings of the finite nature of 
resources, and the unequal effects of climate change that are intensifying inter-national 
and intra-national socio-economic inequalities around the world. Renewed emphasis 
on inequality also raises new possibilities for bringing poverty out of the shadows and 
placing it at the centre of new global histories. 
This interest in the role of poverty and inequality in global history arrives out of my 
own research. The methodological questions around ‘doing global history globally’ and 
‘doing global history from the bottom up’ have been central to my own work. My recently 
published book The Franciscan Invention of the New World (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 
is an intellectual and socio-political history of a radical religious movement known as 
the Franciscan Order.2 The Franciscan Order emerged as a rejection of monetarisation, 
marketization, and to the values engendered by these new economic systems in the 
late Middle Ages. Franciscan monks got into disputes with elites in Europe about the 
legitimacy of individual property, disputes which had a lasting impact on the concepts 
of property and rights. The Franciscan Order was also the first truly global movement 
to emerge from Europe. Franciscans reached East Asia before Marco Polo; they quickly 
establishing themselves in North Africa and the Middle East; and they were the first 
1. T. Piketty, Capital in the Twenty First Century (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2014).
2.  J. McClure, The Franciscan Invention of the New World (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
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to transplant their religious order to the Americas. Their precocious global history was 
shaped not by the principles of acquisition that undergirded imperial expansion, but by a 
religious curiosity rooted in notions of poverty. 
This earlier research has led directly to my current research project, The Poor 
Atlantic, which explores poverty and charity in the making of the Spanish empire. My 
research asks not only how empires made poverty but also how poverty made empires. 
In my research I examine poverty not only as an economic condition but also as a social 
relation and legal subject. Processes of impoverishment and the legal and institutional 
regulations of poverty have been mechanisms of governance that have contributed to the 
construction of the global order. I examine how theological, moral, and legal conceptions 
and management of the poor played a role in projects of nation- and empire-building to 
expose how poverty helped make the modern world. 
 I have convened this roundtable to launch the global history program at the 
University of Glasgow. Unlike similar programs elsewhere, this program will focus 
specifically on the global history of poverty and inequality. The city of Glasgow is a 
suitable site for this kind of research because its own history has been shaped by, amongst 
other things, the slave trade which brought forced migrations to Glasgow, the clearances 
and impoverishment that led to migration from Glasgow, and industries such as ship 
building that have made Glasgow an important node in global processes. 
This roundtable is taking place in connection with the conference Beyond 
Development: The Local Visions of Global Poverty, an AHRC and GCRF funded 
project of the Poverty Research Network, which aims to engage the interdisciplinary 
perspectives across the arts and humanities and social sciences to deepen and diversify 
our understandings of poverty. I established the Poverty Research Project in 2016 to 
promote the interdisciplinary study of global poverty. The Poverty Research Network 
and its current AHRC project aims to re-orientate the field of global history to focus upon 
poverty and to consider the ways in which global history can deepen our understandings 
of poverty. Poverty is part of our global condition, and as global historians we need to 
understand how we arrived here, and what role poverty has played in the making of the 
modern world. 
Today our panellists have been invited to share with us their own stories of how 
they became interested in global history, how they have related to themes of poverty and 
inequality, and whether they see the direction of global history changing in the future.
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Round One: The Field of Global History
In the first part of this round table the panellists were asked to introduce themselves, 
recount the path that led them to work on global history, and consider the ways the field 
has changed. 
Amitava Chowdhury: While my research interests are quite diverse, empirically, my 
work is mostly rooted within the span of the British Empire between the eighteenth and 
twentieth centuries. In the main, I am interested in the histories of labour migrations and 
forms of forced labour. Having earlier trained and worked as an archaeologist, I was 
introduced to what was then called world history in 2004, when I started my graduate 
work at Washington State University.3 At that time, Washington State offered the only 
graduate programme in world history in the entire United States, and you could actually 
graduate with a major field in world history. However, the way scholars imagined world 
history in the early years of the first decade of this century differs significantly from what 
we have come to understand as global history in the last few years.
In 2004, we still very much traced the genealogy to the post-First World War era of 
Spengler and Toynbee, which was later on bolstered by the scholarly efforts of William 
McNeill. Some connected such origins with a deeper history that went back to Herodotus 
stating that nation-state centric histories were an anomaly in what has always essentially 
been a universalist effort. To be sure, the main goal of world history was to move away 
from the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis, but, nevertheless, world history of 
those years still presupposed a given spatial unit only to be filled up by the actions of the 
actors in that geographical area.
The scope of research was also circumscribed. While some took a different route, 
others thought of world history as a synthetic field not based on new empirical primary 
research.4 It was shortly afterwards that historians drew up strong positions separating 
world and global history, and by the end of the decade, global history as a separate field 
was firmly ensconced in American and European academia.5 Global history emerged 
not merely as a history of globalization, but rather as a history of integration. It was 
imagined and practiced not merely as a critique of units of analysis, but more as a radical 
critique of the overall organizational schema of post-Enlightenment thought. I therefore 
see different genealogies, different goals, and different methods that separate world and 
global history. While world histories, by and large, attempted larger generalizations, 
3. Note that several US programs still prefer to call the field world history and have shunned the term of global history. 
4. See, for example, Patrick Manning’s statement: “It remains the case that world historians largely rely on secondary sources 
rather than on their own primary research.” In Palgrave Advances in World Histories, ed. Marnie Hughes-Warrington 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 49. 
5. Of course, Bruce Mazlish has for quite a while identified the differences, but the form that global history took post-
2010, did not exactly align with Mazlish’s version of global history. On Mazlish’s claim, see for example, Bruce Mazlish, 
“Comparing global history to world history,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 28, 3 (1998).
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global history is empirically driven and tends to illuminate local histories of larger global 
processes.
I also want to comment on Julia’s proposal of organizing global history around 
the question of inequality. My own research is not directly in the field of inequality, 
but our own Global History Initiative here at Queen’s serves as an umbrella for a few 
research clusters, and, given our newly established partnership with the Glasgow Poverty 
Research Network that Julia directs, I can well imagine a forthcoming collaborative 
venture in this area. But let me quickly note a few things related to global history and 
inequality. Several broad avenues come to mind: one could examine local histories of 
poverty brought about by global processes of structural inequality; or, alternatively, one 
could look at horizontal and synchronic historical analyses to uncover the histories of 
structural inequality as consequences of colonialism or other processes. Or, we could study 
ecological and environmental determinants that reveal how inequality adversely affects 
some parts of the world more than others. I am sure there are other fruitful avenues that 
others may comment on. Instead, I would like to briefly talk about methodological and 
historiographical inequality—a project that would help us imagine a more usable global 
history for global purposes. My point is about structures of knowledge and the categories 
of analyses that we work with. Postcolonialists have shown us how local categories of 
thought born within specific historical contexts in Europe assumed universal pretensions 
through the vehicle of colonialism and empire.6 Many locally-produced ideas on freedom, 
class, gender, democracy, and sovereignty were results of European historical processes. 
They were not human universals and they can do very little to adequately capture 
the complexities of societies in many parts of the world (ironically, within Europe as 
well). So, one way to address inequality is to free history from the methodological and 
historiographical inequality that was injected into post-Enlightenment thought, which 
eventually travelled the world and determined the shape of nineteenth- and twentieth-
century historiography. One could thus make a connection between the intellectual 
inequality that is so pervasive in our inherited historiography, structures of colonialism, 
and global poverty and inequality. To me, this is a rather urgent task. 
  
Norberto Ferreras: I am a professor at the Universidade Federal Fluminense in Brazil. 
I am researching the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and forced labour through 
the ILO and Brazilian history.
The question with which Julia presents us asks if there will be global histories of 
inequality in future global histories, and I think this is a very good question to reflect on 
with regard to global history. I will talk about this from the perspective of the Global South 
and the perspective of a peripheral country. This round table seems timely since now 
global history has become the new fashion in Brazil. For example, in my university today, 
6. One could cite a whole host of works on this, but Ranajot Guha’s History at the Limit of World-History (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002) is a good place to begin. 
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four out of the sixteen courses we are offering this semester are global history courses. 
This is very unusual, because in other countries, for example Argentina or Mexico, there 
are no global history courses at all. Brazilian historiography is very ‘fashionista’: it likes 
to follow the fashionable trends. In Brazil, we like to take these fashions and explore the 
possibilities they give us. 
I want to explain why it is that global history has become so popular in Brazil. 
For us, our history – Latin America history – is related to our history of colonisation, 
and this is naturally part of ongoing global processes. Colonisation has been a never-
ending process, one that was not brought to an end with independence. It is not just 
an institutional process, we need to think in political, cultural and economic ways to 
understand how European or the United States colonize Latin Americans societies.7 At 
this moment we are experiencing another turning point in the civilization process and 
a wave of new colonialism. This new wave has brought rightist governments to power 
across Latin America, with the exception of Mexico. 
It is important to emphasise that I am speaking from a Brazilian point of view. In 
Brazil, in 1928, Oswald de Andrade presented his anthropophagic manifesto in which he 
discussed the intellectual relationship between Brazil and the most important intellectual 
and artistic movements in Europe. He established some statements, like to move from 
the Shakespearian “To be or not to be, that is the question” to “Tupi or not Tupi, that’s the 
question”. Such statements pointed to the necessity of rescuing the indigenous roots of 
Latin-American history, and its intellectual and social formation.8 The Tupi language is 
one the most diffused language families in Pre-European America. We need to understand 
that Brazil must be anthropophagic, must swallow all European culture and we must 
swallow and digest the coloniser. It means that Brazilian culture does not simply accept 
western culture; Brazilains process it, reflect on it, and then they use in they own way. 
This is the only way to understand what is going on with us and to the others. 
Consequently, we, as Latin-American historians, need to appropriate global 
history in a creative way. We cannot remake the entire global history, from the theory 
or methodological point of view, but we must be part of this History movement and to 
collaborate with our point of view. We need to understand our own globality. America 
was built globally, and – in the turmoil of ideas and people movement from the very 
beginning – incorporated into commercial networks, but in a fragmented way. The 
globality proposed by our disciplines is fragmented too. We need answers about how we 
built our relationship with other regions of the world, mainly Europe, Africa, and North 
America. We think ourselves as a separation in constant transformation. Globality allows 
us to move from methodologic nationalism approaches, to release ourselves as a part of 
7. See, for example: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 
2000).
8. Oswald de Andrade, “Manifesto of Pau-Brasil Poetry,” trans. Stella M. de S. Rego. In: “Latin American Literary Review 
XIV: 27” (January-June, 1986): 184-87.
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it, and not be isolated. 
When Julia asked us about inequality I remembered, of course, Thomas Piketty’s 
work, “Capital in the 21st Century”, which is especially interesting because of its approach.9 
Despite the indisputable importance of the work, one of the limits it presents is that the 
empirical research depends substantially on data collated by nationalist states. In general, 
only the states have the resources and are equipped with a large and efficient bureaucratic 
apparatus are capable of collecting and organising systematically micro-statistical data 
on income and wealth. In that way, global inequality itself creates the conditions for 
analysing global inequality, and what should be explained shapes the explanation in 
sociological terms. Global inequality is a structure of our epistemology currently based 
on it. In empirical terms, writing a history in equal parts, as Romain Bertrand show 
us in “L’Histoire à parts égales”, presupposes a simple archival symmetry that doesn’t 
exist at all.10 That is one of the challenges of social science today: social scientists must 
be able to navigate different empirical repertoires and give to the analysis a status of 
scientific validity. If not, we are creating practices of post-colonial domination. Such 
as the contemporary political economy is a system that radiates at a different historical 
space time of the world to common metric standards. This analysis will be centred for us 
in Brazil at this moment.
Omar Gueye: I am a professor of history at Cheikh Anta Diop University, Dakar. My 
main research deals now with the 1960’s in Africa. I have already written a book on “May 
1968 in Senegal”, which deals also with the French-speaking countries, after many other 
works on labour history, particularly the history of the Labour code in French-speaking 
countries. I am also a graduate in cultural heritage. For today my talk is about global 
history and its relationship to Africa. My interest in the subject has been growing since 
my stay in Harvard as a fellow at the Weatherhead Initiative on global history where I 
contributed the chapter on Africa for the Global History, Globally volume (published in 
2018).
Andrew MacKillop: I am a senior lecturer in Scottish history at the University of 
Glasgow. I too am playing a role in developing global history here at Glasgow. I arrived 
from the University of Aberdeen almost exactly a year ago, I think about the same time 
or three or four months before Jelmer. In some ways I am masquerading here. I am 
in no way, or at best only in some ways, a historian of global history. What I do is 
look at the global boundaries of early modern Scotland as a way of testing some of 
the wider frameworks of early modern globalisation. I am really an historian of human 
mobility and I think it’s interesting that we’ve already heard an emphasis on the well-
9. Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).
10. Romain Bertrand, L’Histoire à parts égales. Récits d’une rencontre, Orient-Occident (XVIe-XVIIe siècle) (Paris : Seuil, 
2011).
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known move away from national frameworks towards the issues of labour. A people-
focussed emphasis, I’m already beginning to notice, is emerging as a key issue in our 
discussions already. Over the last three or four years I have been doing comparative 
work on what I describe as the poor regions of Europe. These are the areas that the 
conventional models explaining proto-globalisation would deem as materially poor and 
suffering from structural inequalities. In that context, my work is really about exploring 
how those regions of Europe access Europe’s global expansion.  
Meha Priyadarshini: I teach at the University of Edinburgh and in our gathering today 
I feel I can safely say that I do global history. In fact, I am not sure I have ever before 
defined myself in this way publicly, partly because there remains a bit of scepticism 
regarding the field and one never knows how the label might be received. On the other 
hand, it’s also true that if I say that I do “global history”, it doesn’t tell you much about 
my expertise, so to be more precise, I will also say that I work on connections between 
Asia and colonial Latin America. I hope that in describing myself in this way you can see 
why it is useful for me to be able to say that I do global history because I am not primarily 
a historian of Asia or of colonial Latin America, although I do know a bit of history of 
the two regions, but what I know a lot about (that experts on those two regions might not 
know as much about) is how the connections between Asia and colonial Latin America 
were forged and what impact they had. So, the label of “global history” helps me to break 
out of the categories of the traditional area studies, and also to define myself as someone 
who is interested in thinking critically about the global connections of the early modern 
period. 
In terms of my educational background, like Amitava, I also did my PhD from a 
global history programme. I was very lucky that I arrived at Columbia University when 
the programme was starting because I’m not sure there were many universities at the 
time that would have allowed me to pursue the project that I ended up doing. On a very 
practical level, then, global history when institutionalized in a department can be very 
liberating in terms of allowing students the freedom to do projects that wouldn’t fit a 
particular area studies model. And we are starting to see the fruits of history departments 
who have instituted a world or global history track. It wasn’t always clear: I think people 
wondered whether I was going to be employable, and, I don’t know if you had the same 
experience, Amitava, but I am proof that one can be employable even without a training 
in just one particular region of the world.  
Sarah Easterby-Smith: I am a senior lecturer in history at St Andrews. I am a historian 
of science and I work primarily on the eighteenth century. I would normally think about 
inequality in terms of inequalities of knowledge and power rather than specifically money, 
although economics obviously plays a big part in all forms of history. 
I first encountered global history as a PhD student at the University of Warwick. 
I started out as a comparativist working on French and British history. But the history 
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department at Warwick “went global” while I was doing my PhD! From about 2006 
onwards, one of my supervisors, Maxine Berg, and her colleagues devoted a tremendous 
amount of energy to organising reading groups and workshops to examine the possibilities 
that global history might offer, and how this label might set a new agenda for history as 
a discipline. These conversations were very formative for me as a doctoral student.
I then subsequently came across different interpretations of global history at the 
other institutions where I studied and worked – especially the European University 
Institute and the University of St Andrews. Indeed, at St Andrews we don’t actually have 
a centre for global history; instead we have an Institute for Transnational and Spatial 
History. When I arrived in 2012, I initially felt a bit confused by the emphasis on the 
“transnational” instead of the “global”. However, the longer I’ve been there the more 
evident it seems that the differences between these approaches are often, in fact, very 
small. I agree with Amitava that the labels “world” and “global” often refer to different 
methodological approaches. But the methodologies we use as “global” (or “world” or 
“transnational”) historians are still under debate and thus in flux. As a result, it is often 
the case that the clearest distinction between “global”, “world” and “transnational” is 
the semantic one; they do not necessarily describe radically different sets of questions, 
perspectives or scales (the one exception is periodisation, because “transnational” 
technically refers to the late modern era).
I’d like to suggest two possible topics for our initial discussion – one general point 
regarding periodisation and one more specific, about the ways in which historians of 
science have responded to global history. 
With regard to the first, I think it’s important to reflect on the ways in which 
global history is different when we are discussing an age before the advent of steam and 
telegraphs and fast communications. We can of course still have a holistic conversation 
with historians working on late-modern global history, but I do think that the significance 
of those practical constraints and structural differences always needs to be stressed.
With regards to the second, many historians of science have engaged actively 
with global history. Much of this work has retained the notion of ‘inequality’ as a central 
feature of the analysis. This can largely be linked to an aim to situate colonial and imperial 
histories in a broader framework, moving the discussion away from the now-hackneyed 
colonised-coloniser dichotomy and into histories of interactions, exchanges, secrecies 
and resistances. We can expand on that later if we want to. 
Jelmer Vos: I came to global history as a historian of Africa studying the Atlantic slave 
trade as well as the history of Angola, with a special interest in commodities like rubber 
and coffee. By following the coffee commodity chain, I am connecting people in Angola 
to other places in the world, including the Netherlands and the United States.
Steven Serels: I have a joint position as a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University and as 
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a Research Officer at Martin Luther Universitӓt Halle-Wittenberg. My research focuses 
on the history of the Red Sea, but I would call myself a global historian. I have no 
problem staking that claim. Unlike many of my colleagues, I didn’t come to global history 
after having been through an undergraduate education steeped in more conventional 
approaches. My unusual path to a PhD in history began with a Bachelors of Fine Arts. 
I began studying history as a graduate student at McGill University and immediately 
gravitated to the Indian Ocean World Centre. Indian Ocean Studies is structured around 
a very particular narrative of globalization. This field has been organized around the 
central claims: 1) that from at least the 11th century, but maybe even earlier, a regional 
economy emerged that linked places as distant as China and East Africa through maritime 
connections that were cosmopolitan, successful, and produced wealth and abundance; 
2) that this was until relatively recently the centre of the world economy; and 3) that 
Europe was a peripheral territory in this economy. Over the course of what we came to 
call modernity, the Indian Ocean World economy was either dismantled or fell apart as 
the rest of the world became integrated into a new global economy centred on Europe 
and the North Atlantic.  
Indian Ocean Studies’ stress on global interconnections seemed initiatively true 
to me. Perhaps this was a result of being the child of immigrants from a historically 
peripatetic community. Nonetheless, I continue to use this framework simply because 
I find it to be empirically true. Transregional interconnections across the Red Sea have 
historically been very important, so much so that the African Red Sea littoral should be 
considered as the real hinterland for Mecca. Global interconnections in the Red Sea are 
and have been life-sustaining. For centuries, communities in this region ate Indian grain. 
Without large, regular imports of food stuffs, Red Sea communities would not have been 
able to support themselves. I do not know what could be more global than that. 
Round Two: Inequality as the Future of Global History
Julia McClure: When I used social media to advertise the round table it received a great 
response, with one responder describing the focus on inequality as “the much-needed 
paradigmatic change in global history”. When I proposed this round table on “Inequality: 
the Future of Global History?” I expected more resistance to the proposition from global 
historians. In many ways, inequality has long been a dominant paradigm in global history. 
The 2000 publication of Ken Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence focused upon inter-
national inequality through examining how wealth accumulated in the West. Yet The 
Great Divergence model was so prominent that it also overshadowed parallel or alternate 
inequalities both within nations and not visible through the lens of the nation state. This 
focus on the macro-analysis of inter-national inequality has also not made poverty its 
main focus. The questions I had for our panellists concerned how the future of global 
history will change, what will be the new directions in the global history of inequality, 
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and what also does it mean when we think about poverty also as a framework for thinking 
about the world and about global history? Does that re-orientate our perspectives? 
 
Omar Gueye: I focus mainly on African history and global history and, as Norberto 
said for Latin America, the history of decolonisation has not ended. African history, if I 
take the example of my country, Senegal, was probably a history in the French language 
in Senegal and, therefore, a legacy [of colonialism]. For Africans, there was an attitude 
of militancy in writing history and talking about history. The history programs taught 
to children during French colonization were “Our ancestors the Gauls”. Young children 
in Africa, mainly from Senegal, were thus raised on the basis of the French system and 
had become good francophones, as I am today. So, it was as if after independence - 
which meant political independence and economic independence - Africans also needed 
cultural independence, and it was especially a big challenge for history researchers who 
had to deal with many problems in Africa.
In our approach, we must then discuss some very interesting points about African 
history and global history. What is Africa’s place in the global movement? And what 
is Africa? We should define - or redefine - Africa. Indeed, when we talk about Africa, 
we think mostly of a black Africa, so to Sub-Saharan Africa. So, the Maghreb, North 
Africa, is not concerned. Southern Africa is not concerned either. Moreover, only 
a “white Africa”, in development, is in a way linked to globalization. We must then 
clearly redefine and clarify what Africa is. The question of methodology is raised. [In 
the colonial mind,] it was as if oral history was not history. [Oral narration, though,] is 
the main source of the book entitled, Sundiata: an Epic of Old Mali, written by Djibril 
Tamsir Niane.11 Even better, after Yves Person wrote his book, Samori – one of Africa’s 
most important heroes – it was as if it was accepted that oral history can be considered 
a valuable source, and that African history has legitimacy and can be taught as such.12 
Studying African history is an important contribution to the debate about peripheral 
history and global history. Until now, Africa has often been considered as part of “French 
history” or “British history”. This debate could help to redefine Africa, as well as to 
challenge certain paradigms. In a nutshell, global history is a way to rethink Africa in 
relation to the global process. This framework is undoubtedly an opportunity to connect 
the human sciences with programs that can be widely shared around the world between 
African academics and their colleagues from other parts of the world. For global history, 
re-problematizing historical research paradigms in Africa is a new challenge.
Some questions I must answer relate to the growing interconnectedness that shapes 
modern life, as in the case of global history, by unpackaging – or repackaging – the 
unequal power relationships that shape international trade, geopolitics, and academic 
11. Djibril Tamsir Niane, Soundjata ou l’Épopée Mandingue (Paris: Présence Africaine 1960). English Translation: 
Sundata: an epic of old Mali (London: Longmans, 1965).
12.  Yves Person, Samori: une revolution dyula (Dakar: I.F.A.N., 1968).
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architecture. Is this new framework a chance to create or erase the profile of Africa? 
Another crucial question is who will fund the research. Many very important African 
studies centers are emerging all over the world, certainly, but what kind of research 
is intended to do? Search on what? That’s the question. It is as if, for example, the 
definition of research topics depends on the interests of those who finance. For example, 
in medicine, research on the Ebola virus or HIV was conducted mainly because of its 
interest in the North, while the real challenge in Africa was and remains malaria. This 
medical example illustrates one of the reasons why I ask the question of how research 
should be oriented and why we should rethink colonial history in order to rehabilitate 
a true African history. Linking African history to Global history, on the one hand, and 
linking southern and northern institutions, on the other, are undoubtedly major challenges 
for our research network. Fortunately, we have collaborative working groups, like the 
one we have today in Glasgow, whose panelists come from many parts of the world. 
Finally, we need to define new research trajectories and especially strategies to achieve 
what we want to do, especially with African research and global history.
Andrew MacKillop: I suppose, in a sense, I’ll stick unimaginatively to the issue of how 
I come to the subject of Global History, what are the recent trends in my work, and what 
possible directions and perspectives might flow from that work. As I said during the 
introductions, I came to global history from what would seem a very conventional set 
of starting points. I began my early work looking at the question of how early modern, 
mostly seventeenth- to early nineteenth-century Scotland – which is a small, very wet, 
impoverished Northern European society – shifted from its traditional intra-European 
culture of human mobility into a global framework. Scotland did so very rapidly, 
and everybody noticed it at the time. In under one-hundred years it goes from being 
known as a nation of emigrants inside Europe to being a nation of immigrants that are 
scattered across Arctic North America, in China, in India, the Caribbean and the areas 
of colonization in North America. Its history is not that of a polity globalising but of a 
people globalising.  
Such a starting point is fairly conventional and arguably even potentially regressive. 
It makes me Eurocentric, to be sure. It privileges nation, if not in the modern sense, then at 
a certain territorial level. It certainly presumes a Scottish spatiality as the privileged unit 
of analysis. It’s even a small unit of analysis, especially set against the wide parameters 
of global history. This perspective of course ties into diaspora, which has always been 
a theme of global history. That initial interest morphed into a comparative study of how 
early modern Ireland and Scotland – as examples of what I think Norberto referred 
to as peripheral countries – can challenge traditional understandings of how historic 
globalisation worked. How do they integrate into the British world system through the 
seventeenth to nineteenth centuries? Answering this question involves looking at the 
effect on finance, state formation, patterns of consumption, as well as question of how 
you access and consume luxuries if you’re a materially poor society. What effect is there 
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on your social hierarchies, your purchasing power, the traditional mediating commercial 
and urban agents? In the case of Scotland and indeed Ireland, these two societies 
immediately challenge some of the basic assumptions. For example, globalisation is not 
shoring up the European state; in the case of Scotland and Ireland, it obliterates them. 
They are subsumed into a bigger unit. So, as examples, they immediately begin to pose 
questions about some of the ways we calibrate and assume that Europe operates as an 
unproblematic ‘core’. In the shape of places like Ireland and Scotland, Europe has its 
own peripheries. 
My own specific interest is how might these relatively small, materially 
impoverished societies have wider significance and help us to understand early modern 
or proto-globalisation. We’re talking pre-1815 developments here; this has led me in 
recent work into thinking about some of the more influential models. When you read 
older frameworks like Wallerstein’s world-systems, Pomeranz’s Great Divergence, or 
even Parthasarathi’s super Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not, they are not well 
calibrated to societies like Scotland and Ireland. Perhaps understandably, they privilege 
what they call the core regions of Europe. That basically means Amsterdam, Lisbon, 
Seville, London, their hinterlands, North West France etc. The scope and ambition of 
these models mean they do not give us a particularly sensitive ability to understand how 
societies like Scotland and Ireland – noted by everyone as being both extremely poor and 
prone to mobility – operated. After all, these countries lacked some of the key financial 
state and societal infrastructures which, according to Pomeranz, gave areas like the 
Netherlands or England their comparative advantages over South Asia or other similarly 
productive parts of the world, like South East coastal China. Scotland and Ireland did not 
have these comparative advantages. They were impoverished by conventional measures 
of wealth. They were seen by contemporary observers as exemplars of poor Europe. 
They were deeply unequal societies, and were commented upon as such. They did not 
have a large urban sector. They were societies where the aristocracy and the supposedly 
old feudal order remained hugely powerful. They were more like Poland or Lithuania in 
key respects.  
As supposedly peripheral countries, they relied upon modes of expansion that 
were necessarily different, and that led me into looking particularly at how Ireland and 
Scotland branched into Asia. There is a lot of work done on the Atlantic with regard 
both these societies. But until you understood the huge expansions into Asia you could 
not then say that these modes of expansion were truly global. A number of concepts 
really come to the fore when you look at what I am going to describe as ‘poor region 
globalisation’. Human capital emerges as the mode of expansion, not big state structures. 
Scottish and Irish society had very little or no venture finance, so they could not mobilise 
monetary capital. What they did instead was to deploy or throw people at the problem. I 
want to stress that this mode of expansion is not strictly diasporic as it is often understood 
in global history, as the sort of migratory maiden hand of the movement of capital. This 
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is certainly the movement of capital: but it is configured in the form of the movement 
of people. It is a mode of globalisation heavily dependent on human capital. The ‘poor 
region’ answer to the problem of a lack of capital can be recovered in the ways in which 
Ireland and Scotland per capita were moving very large numbers of people all over the 
world, increasingly by 1700 and certainly by 1800. 
Their examples also reveal how incredibly sensitive and prone to diversity these 
economies of human capital were. This is because, within Scotland and Ireland, you 
ended up with sub-regions that specialised in the movement of particular types of human 
capital rather than others. Crudely put, Ireland relied upon a ‘high volume’ economy, 
i.e. the movement of large numbers. The problem is that Irish society found it difficult 
when repatriating the material or finance capital. Yet this is the whole point of a human 
capital economy. You send people out; you get money back. Scotland moved far less 
human capital, but what it did move tended to be what sociologists describe as ‘high 
value’. These individuals were imbued with large amounts of cultural capital. The ability 
to generate high value human capital was partly down to early modern Scotland’s large 
educational sector. So, as a society, Scotland was moving less people. But the results 
were that very high rates of capital repatriation returned.  
Both Ireland and Scotland were moving people across the global, but this generates 
new forms of material inequality. Scotland accrued greater material advantage but Ireland 
did not. Countries reliant on human capital will often generate huge regional inequalities, 
leaving parts of a supposedly same nation to get richer, while other areas get materially 
poorer. The West of Ireland and the Highlands ended up in modes of human capital 
exportation that made them progressively poorer, while Glasgow, Bristol, Dublin, or 
Belfast, got materially richer. These divergences led me into the idea of glocalism; that 
is, understanding the big, structural forces via the local level.  
I think glocalism is a hugely useful framework. It enables us to still talk about 
transnational networks, mediated through national frameworks of analysis, but in ways 
that are sensitive to diversities on the ground. I think it has got major implications for 
how we might renew area and regional studies. I think too that the family unit, or the 
idea of ‘the familial state’, is going to become a major way in which global history will 
be explored in the future. To this I should add religion. One of the biggest differences 
between Ireland and Scotland was ultimately that the religious cultures in both societies 
tended to produce human capital movements that were structured in different ways. I 
could see religion as being another mode that will be revisited in useful ways in the 
future.  
Amitava Chowdhury: My theoretical interests are in the areas of global historiography 
and the meaning of diasporas, but empirically I have been interested in two broad areas: 
Indian indentured labour and the late history of slavery and fugitive slaves. Drawing 
from my own areas of research, I think I can talk a bit about imagining global history in 
a different way. The common perception within the historical academe is that the global 
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is a spatial concept, a concept dealing with an expansive spatial unit, possibly the entire 
planet. The American anthropologist, Arjun Appadurai, had an interesting critique in 
mind when he said, “We cannot simplify matters by imagining that the global is to space 
what the modern is to time.”13 For Appadurai, modernity is not a linear chronological 
movement from the past to the modern, but often is “an elsewhere” for many societies. 
Similarly, the global as a spatial concept is inadequate and must also be read as a “temporal 
wave.” Thus, we need to disabuse our students, universities, and larger academia from 
the idea that the global is solely or necessarily a macro-historical perspective. It does not 
have to be a spatial category that encompasses the entire planet.
 Here, R. Bin Wong’s China Transformed might be quite useful.14 Bin Wong, in the 
context of late imperial China, shows the workings of a “fractal quality”—the replication 
of arrangement of historical structures in multiple scales and levels of government. So, 
drawing from my own work on indentured labour, I see a very interesting pattern on how 
imperial policies on a global imperial scale are repeated and replicated in local colonial 
scales in various cash crop plantations in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. Thus, 
structures of inequality and poverty and hierarchies of poverty—somewhat different in 
each individual context—are woven together by a larger global imperial backdrop. Thus, 
the goal of global history is to not flatten the world and identify universal patterns, but 
rather to trace how larger processes are manifested differently in different local contexts. 
We can choose to disabuse ourselves from the spatial category of the global and rather 
look at it as fractals of replications of structure in smaller local scales working within a 
larger global imperial backdrop.
And, finally, assuming that there are graduate students in this room, I want to 
underline Meha’s point on global history and employability. Perhaps it is an important 
thing to talk about, especially on an occasion where we are launching a new program in 
global history. I remember rather wistfully that when I started my doctoral research, the 
general wisdom was that you needed to specialise in a geographical area and then impose 
a global history approach. Otherwise you would not be employable. I think that has 
changed and changed rather radically. I now supervise four doctoral projects that have 
thrown away the regional scaffolding and the misleading frames of artificial geopolitical 
units. And similarly, when I look at new PhDs coming out from the leading global history 
programs in the US, including Harvard, I see that people have started global historical 
questions that are not tied to any regional (and certainly not national) specializations. 
If anything, at least in the last five or six years, such global projects have been more 
employable within the larger discipline. Therefore, just as we have to disabuse ourselves 
13. Arjun Appadurai, Modernity in Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 
1996), 9. Appadurai goes on to say that, “For many societies, modernity is an elsewhere, just as the global is a temporal wave 
that must be encountered in their present.” 
14. Roy Bin Wong, China transformed: historical change and the limits of European experience (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997).
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from the idea that global history is merely a macro-historical perspective, we should also 
correct our stance vis-à-vis graduate and postgraduate training and embrace the fact that 
global projects are indeed employable. That is my sense, but I am, of course, open to 
corrections and other thoughts.
Meha Priyadarshini: Building on what Amitava just said about the utility of global 
history I wondered if this might be a moment to briefly mention the Jeremy Adelman 
article that came out in 2017 where he criticises global history and portends its demise.15 
Julia McClure: Indeed, Adelman’s Aeon article opened an important debate on the 
current state of global history and the implications of recent transformations of the 
political context in which global historians are writing today. We had a discussion 
group on it when I arrived at Glasgow last year. Jeremy Adelman was also at one of 
Warwick GHCC’s recent conferences (April 2018) on ‘scales, spaces, and contexts, in 
the history of the local and global,’ part of the AHRC Global Microhistories network. 
He gave a presentation on ‘Global History Now - Can we Reposition the Local?’ During 
his presentation he was asked to expand more on his recent Aeon article. The article 
seemed to suggest the imminent end of global history as the dreams of living in a more 
cosmopolitan world have faded and we have witnessed a resurgence of ethno-nationalism 
and a hardening of borders. Adelman observed how the field of global history had rapidly 
expanded but now seemed to describe the world in a way that was ‘out of step with the 
times’. He pointed to many methodological problems within global history, such as the 
limitations of language and the dominance of English in describing the world, and the 
fact that the production of global history did not become more globalised but was led by 
elite centres in the Anglo-American world. In this article Adelman claimed that ‘to some 
extent, global history sounds like a now defunct Clinton Global Initiative, a shiny, high-
profile endeavour emphasising borderless, do-good storytelling about our cosmopolitan 
commonness’. It sounds quite damning, but Adelman responded that the article has been 
mis-read and was not proclaiming the end of global history, only that global historians 
needed to change what they were doing, to incorporate non-elite histories, and remember 
the power of place, which has remained important – especially to poorer people. 
Meha Priyadarshini: While his criticisms might be valid to some extent, scholars have 
made such arguments before and the field has responded. I can think of many works that 
avoid exactly the pitfalls that you have described. I am thinking of the global histories of 
cotton, or the works on merchant networks that are both global and intensely local, i.e. 
the works of Engseng Ho, Sebouh Aslanian, and Francesca Trivellato, and works that 
look at the impact of international orders precisely on the poor and disenfranchised, such 
15. Jeremy Adelman, “What is Global History Now?” Aeon, 2 (March 2017). 
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as those by Adam McKeown and Matt Connelly. Adelman was criticized for his short 
sightedness and perhaps, rightly so.16 
Julia McClure: There has been a lot of response. Indeed Richard Drayton and David 
Motadel wrote an article published in the Journal of Global History in 2018 opening 
a discussion on the futures of global history in response to Adelman’s Aeon piece, and 
rebuffing its criticisms of global history. Adelman has responded and claimed that the 
reaction to his article mis-represented his argument, and that he still thinks global history 
has a future. 
 This round table can be seen as part of the discussion that has been opened on 
the future of global history, and there seems to be some consensus that global history 
needs to transcend its elite focus. Poverty and inequality need to be central to the future 
of global history. This raises new conceptual possibilities for the ways we think about 
space and movement, the immobilities as well as the mobilities, resistance and friction 
as well as flow. We also need to think about how global history is written, by whom and 
for whom, and to think about the ways global history as a discipline can be represented 
as it moves forward. 
Meha Priyadarshini: I actually have to thank Julia because I hadn’t thought about my 
work as addressing questions of inequality, but maybe there are a few ways in which it 
does. As I mentioned before, I work on the connections between colonial Latin America 
and Asia and for my book I focused on Asian commodities traded to the Spanish 
American colonies. The project was a multi-sited work, and so it considers the same 
trade network from several different vantage points, and in so doing, highlights several 
different inequalities. 
One inequality is a historiographical one. When we think about the early modern 
period and consumption of Asian commodities, the images that probably most often 
come to mind are portraits of elite European families drinking tea in porcelain cups 
in their parlour rooms. We are aware of the impact that trade with Asia had in western 
Europe. In my work I point out that societies in Spanish colonies also had access to 
these goods, and within those societies, indigenous people too could wear fine silks or 
commission folding screens made after Japanese models. It upends our idea of who had 
access to luxuries in the early modern period and challenges the centrality of Europe in 
16. Giorgio Riello, Cotton: The Fabric that Made the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Sven Beckert, 
Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015); Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy 
and Mobility across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Sebouh Aslanian, From the Indian 
Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2014); Francesca Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno and Cross-
Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012); Adam McKeown, Melancholy 
Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Matthew Connelly, 
Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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early modern global connections. I argue that in colonial Latin America it was not just 
an aspiration to be cosmopolitan that drove the desire to consume Asian goods, but the 
direct trade with Asia also allowed the colony to distance itself from the metropole. So, 
when I situate myself in colonial Latin America, the transpacific connection to Asia is 
hugely important 
However, if you look at the same trade from the Asian perspective, while we can 
see that it definitely benefited many Chinese and other merchants, the arrival of the 
Spanish in the Philippines also disconnected many communities from pre-existing trade 
networks and took away their livelihoods. And even in China, it is not clear that the 
producers of the commodities that were so important to global trade really benefited from 
this increasingly connected world. Their own experience of producing silk or porcelain 
was very different from that of the people who were using these goods around the world. 
So one thing that we really need to keep in mind as we think about inequality is 
about the nature of global connections, and this is especially true for early modernists 
because we become really excited about all the connections that exist in this period 
because they were new. However, the creation of a new connection often meant the 
severing of an older one, and we should always be aware of this.
Julia McClure: Thanks for this. Another of the key debates in global history has 
concerned the question of why Latin America has been left out of global history. This 
issue was raised in an article published by Matthew Brown in the Journal of Global 
History in 2015. I contributed to a panel on this question at the Society of Latin American 
Studies Annual Conference in 2016. Brown argues that Latin Americanists have feared 
that global history would contribute to the loss of culture-specific knowledge of Latin 
America, which has contributed to Latin Americanists and global historians remaining 
separate. This is a question of methodology as well as perspective. Brown noted that 
‘global history has been slow to see Latin America as one of its centres of gravity, which 
instead were believed in Eurasia. For Meha and I, who are global historians of the early 
modern Spanish Empire, this seems at once strange and familiar. On the one hand, it 
seems clear that especially in the early modern period, Latin America was central to global 
connections. On the other hand, it is true that the history of Latin America is often under-
represented within global history centres and that it can be difficult to involve people in 
Latin American centres in global history projects. This raises methodological questions 
for the field of global history, since regional centres are essential for the development of 
skills and expertise in languages and cultures. But it is also important to think about the 
questions that global history is asking for it to be of interest to Latin Americanists and 
for Latin American history to be incorporated in a meaningful way, which may also mean 
challenging some of the normative assumptions within global history.
Sarah Easterby-Smith: I would like to echo much of what has already been said, 
especially Meha’s contribution above. I would like to take up the points about scales and 
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especially the relationship between the micro and the global.  
As Amitava intimated above, one of the criticisms that global or world history has 
received is based on a concern that it tries to do the impossible – to connect up everything 
all at once or cover a massive scale. In general, the ‘global’ histories of science produced 
in the past few decades have been less subject to such criticism. This is because they tend 
to take a more ‘microhistorical’ approach, focusing on the movement of specific items, 
ideas, or individuals, and then relating the evidence upwards to bigger concepts or social 
formulations.
Recent history of science has been less receptive to the large-scale variety of global 
or world history partly due to developments within the field over the second half of the 
twentieth century. Mid-twentieth-century scholars like George Basalla, Joseph Needham 
and their students wrote about the purported ‘spread of Western science’ outwards 
from Europe and examined the extent to which non-European cultures ‘contributed’ to 
‘modern’ (i.e. Western) science.17 But that broad-brush, Eurocentric approach to thinking 
about the history of knowledge has changed radically; most history of science now seeks 
to locate subjects within their contemporary cultural and social contexts. This work 
forms part of a broader move that emphasised the value of looking at interactions and 
connections and which thus found grand narratives of scientific ‘progress’, or global 
‘divergence’, unsatisfactory. Historians of science increasingly sought to understand 
practice and to focus on the contexts of knowledge making, knowledge exchange and 
knowledge creation. This has been very important and very helpful for thinking about 
global histories (plural) of science.  
Historians of science have also paid attention to the issues that global history 
raises about methodology, sources, and Eurocentrism. Indeed, some – not least Sujit 
Sivasundaram, Kapil Raj, and Lissa Roberts – have argued persuasively that we should 
revise the ways in which we collect and interpret evidence. As the majority of sources 
available have been compiled and archived by Europeans, they and others have suggested 
methods for reading the evidence so as to revise the categories that we apply in our research, 
moving away from dichotomous modes of thought and aiming, in Sivasundaram’s words, 
to ‘fragment’ our own knowledge traditions.18 Raj has reassessed the way in which we 
understand the ‘circulation’ of information in the context of postcolonial scholarship, 
emphasising agency (even in a context of inequality) and the transformations that can 
take place on all sides.19 Roberts has proposed that the concept of ‘dispersion’ might offer 
us greater analytic potential because it allows us to start our analyses within ‘centres of 
accumulation’ (rather than in Western institutions), and avoids the closure that ‘circulation’ 
17.George Basalla, “The Spread of Western Science,” Science, 156 (1967), 611-622; Joseph Needham, Science and 
Civilisation in China, 7 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954-2005).
18. Sujit Sivasundaram, “Sciences and the Global. On Methods, Questions, and Theory,” Isis, 101 (2010), 146-158.
19. Kapil Raj, “Beyond Postcolonialism … and Postpositivism: Circulation and the Global History of Science,” Isis, 104, 2 
(2013): 337-347.
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can imply.20 All emphasise the value of developing micro-historical approaches that pay 
close attention to local circumstances, specificities and perspectives, and then relating 
the evidence upwards and outwards to larger-scale processes. This is certainly what I am 
trying to achieve in my current project about the circulation of knowledge in the Indian 
Ocean World. But I think there’s still a lot more work to be done and a lot more scope 
for creativity in terms of rethinking how we go about our research – it’s an exciting area.
I would also like to say something – and this is more directly in response to 
Amitava’s comments, above – about the state. Over the past few decades, early modern 
global historians, as well as historians of science, have paid increasing attention to the 
historical roles played by things, objects, people, go-betweens and networks.21 This is 
fantastic and has led to some very helpful contributions to the historiography, but that 
should not be at the expense of thinking about bigger frameworks such as the state or 
bigger structures, such as the major trading companies. We need to retain those within our 
frames of analysis as well, and to aim to understand the ways in which the big structure 
relates down to the individuals and how that relationship was then nuanced within local 
situations and local places – very much along the lines that Andrew sketched out above. 
In some ways, this approach will bring us back to questions that were posed in the 1990s, 
but I hope that, as we develop a new set of global history methodologies, we will be able 
to ask and hopefully answer these in different ways.
Julia McClure: Thank you very much, and I think this recurring point about inequalities 
of knowledge is very important. It draws our attention to the epistemologies, and also 
to normative structures such as law, which have helped to structure and perpetuate 
inequalities. 
Sarah Easterby-Smith: Absolutely. Some of those points precisely have been taken up 
in a recent special issue of Itinerario about legal cultures in the Indian Ocean World.22 
Jelmer Vos: How has the field developed? I can reflect a little on that question regarding 
Africa. As Omar Gueye has recently pointed out, there is growing recognition of Africa’s 
legitimate place in the study of global history. Africa’s centrality to global history has 
been most effectively underlined by studies of the Atlantic slave trade. Historians like 
Joseph Inikori stress the point that African slave labour was fundamental to the creation 
of an integrated world economy centred on the Atlantic basin.23 More generally, in the 
20. Lissa Roberts, “‘Le centre de toutes choses’: Constructing and Managing centralization on the Isle de France,” History 
of Science, 52, 3, (2014), 319-342.
21. Simon Schaffer, Lissa Roberts, Kapil Raj and James Delbourgo (eds.), The Brokered World. Go-Betweens and Global 
Inteligence, 1770-1820 (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2009).
22. Mahmood Kooria and Sanne Ravensbergen (eds.), “The Indian Ocean of Law: Hybridity and Space,” Itinerario, 42 
(Special Issue 2) (August 2018).
23. Joseph E. Inikori, “Africa and the Globalization Process: Western Africa, 1450-1850,” Journal of Global History 2, 1 
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wake of John Thornton’s foundational study, Africa and Africans in the Making of the 
Atlantic World, several historians have proposed different ways in which the agency of 
Africans was fundamental to the development of trade relations with Europe and the 
creation of transatlantic connections.24 And we now see increasingly sophisticated ways 
of analysing African contributions to the Atlantic world. James Sweet, for instance, 
has used Portuguese Inquisition records to make a case for an Atlantic world created 
on African terms. He claims that Africans were not merely influencing the religious 
structures put in place by European empires, but imposed their own religious traditions 
on them, creating an “alternate modernity.”25
More generally, Africanist historians working on different parts of the continent 
are showing important regional contributions to Africa’s integration into global religious 
and economic networks. Africa is no longer seen as a passive periphery of this or that 
world system. Instead, the way forward is to see Africa as containing multiple hubs in the 
creation of global networks. Places like Jenne, Anomabo, or Zanzibar were not just sitting 
on the margins of other people’s empires but were central nodes in the global webs they 
got tied into and which they subsequently helped shape.26 This does not mean that Africans 
were suddenly controlling the system, but by understanding Africa’s contributions we 
can at least reframe the question about what it means to be at the periphery of a world 
system centred in Asia or Europe.27 
In relation to the question about global inequalities, the idea that Africans entered 
the world economy on unequal terms, as Rodney, Wallerstein and others used to argue, 
has become debatable. Africans entered as equal partners and while their societies might 
not have gained the same benefits from their integration in the global economy – think 
of economic development – it did not necessarily leave them poorer either. And that, in 
turn, was related to what some argue was the continent’s poor integration in the world 
economy: perhaps not so many Africans were affected by global economic developments. 
So, here we might reach the limits of global history!
In fact, Africanist historians have been some of the fiercest critics of global history, 
or at least the kind of histories that privileges Africa’s connections with external worlds, 
as if everything emanates from these linkages, which some argue had only limited 
reach. Not everything that happened in the African past was determined by maritime 
(2007), 63-86.
24. John K. Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, Second Edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
25. James H. Sweet, Domingos Álvares, African Healing, and the Intellectual History of the Atlantic World (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011).
26. Randy J. Sparks, Where the Negroes are Masters: An African Port in the Era of the Slave Trade (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2014).
27. Michael N. Pearson, Port Cities and Intruders: The Swahili Coast, India, and Portugal in the Early Modern Era 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998); Jeremy Prestholdt, Domesticating the World: African Consumerism and 
the Genealogies of Globalization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
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connections with people and places located outside the continent.28 Global history does 
indeed seem to privilege maritime connections between continents. You might wonder, 
could global history also be intra-continental? Anyway, the two positions are not mutually 
exclusive. You can study African contributions to global developments while at the same 
time recognising that not all of Africa is equally, or at every level, affected by such 
developments.
Other fascinating developments in the field come from environmental history, with 
scholars exploring botanical exchanges (initially in the Atlantic, but others have begun 
to look at the Indian Ocean) or the spread of malaria out of Africa to other parts of the 
world.29 Interestingly, these histories are often tied to histories of human migration, so 
interdisciplinarity is becoming increasingly important. And, to come back to the earlier 
point on the significance of maritime connections, we should note that crops introduced 
in Africa via maritime routes, like maize, cassava and the banana, often did travel very 
far and fundamentally transformed the lives of people deep inland.30
Finally, there are interesting developments in Africa related to the history of global 
commodity chains. Africa has, of course, a long history of exporting products other than 
slaves. Some of these commodities, like gold, ivory, rubber, as well as some agricultural 
crops, played significant roles in the global economy, but the study of their production 
and trade has often been through a predominantly Africanist lens, focussing on the 
African response to external demand for this or that raw material. Bringing in a global 
perspective means looking at ways in which Africans shaped foreign markets, not just as 
producers but also as consumers of goods made in other parts of the world.
Julia McClure: This is an important reflection on how global history is transforming 
African history and vice versa. I think the question of whether global history could 
also be intra-continental raises signposts for a future direction in global history and 
the history of Africa. Global history has often focused upon maritime connections. In 
2010 Maria Fusaro and Amelia Polania published an edited volume demonstrating the 
importance of maritime history to global history. It observed that the sea has been an 
important conduit for the development of global connections and that global trade and 
globalisation emerged with the Manila galleon trade and the opening of trans-Pacific sea 
routes.31 Yet this focus on maritime connections has often prioritised certain places and 
peoples, often meaning that global history has been written not only as the history of 
28. Pier Larson, “African Slave Trades in Global Perspective,” in The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History, eds. 
John Parker and Richard Reid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 56-76.
29. James L. A. Webb Jr., Humanity’s Burden: A Global History of Malaria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
30. Judith A. Carney and Richard Nicholas Rosomoff, In the Shadow of Slavery: Africa’s Botanical Legacy in the Atlantic 
World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); James C. McCann, Maize and Grace: Africa’s Encounter with a 
New World Crop, 1500-2000 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); David Lee Schoenbrun, A Green Place, 
a Good Place: Agrarian Change, Gender, and Social Identity in the Great Lakes Region to the 15th Century (Portsmouth, 
NH: Heinemann, 1998).
31. Maria Fusaro and Amelia Polania, Maritime History as Global History (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2010).
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maritime connections but as the history of European empires. Reorienting perspective to 
an intra-continental perspective might facilitate the decolonisation of global history as it 
transforms the coordinates of ‘centre-periphery’ established by world-systems analysis. 
However, in doing so it should not undo the gains made by global history in overcoming 
the boundaries imposed by area studies. The trans-continental approaches to Eurasia 
may offer some examples. Scholarship that has taken Eurasia as its unit of analysis has 
transformed understandings of both Europe and Asia, and questioned the economic and 
cultural boundaries between the two.32 Histories of the silk roads have reoriented our 
understanding of geopolitical, cultural, and economic landscapes, and shown that places 
like Samarkand were not peripheral but centres of economic and cultural exchange.33 
Crucially, this Eurasian approach has also changed how we think about Europe and 
European uniqueness.34 These projects are in a sense correcting some of the geopolitical 
inequalities of older historical imaginaries.    
Steven Serels: I want to pushback against the choice to focus on inequality instead of 
poverty. Poverty is different from inequality. Inequality is a relative state and poverty 
is an absolute state. There can be inequality of wealth distribution between two rich 
people if one is richer than the other. This doesn’t change the fact that they are both 
rich. Unfortunately, the focus on inequality does not address the fact that there is abject 
poverty in the world. It also doesn’t critique the dominant narrative in the field of global 
history, which is the accumulation of wealth. The focus on, for example, the disparity 
between the relative rise of Europe vis-à-vis China in the nineteenth century does not 
address the history of poor people themselves. 
 I also want to push against any kind of knee-jerk veneration or critique of global 
processes. Over the past two years, I have witnessed a radical shift in the way globalization 
has been criticized. It used to be that globalization was critically identified as a harm that 
was replacing culture in the developed world with brands and was producing economic 
harm and ecological devastation in the developing world. Now, the critical voices are 
for deeper global interconnections and against structures that divide the world into 
hermeneutic localities. I think now especially we need to be nuanced in our assessment of 
globalization and global networks. We need to see them as a kind of resource that comes 
with its own dangers. This I think gets at a new way of honestly doing global history 
from below. It is unmistakable that for much of the Global South, modern globalization 
has been linked to the spread of poverty. Current conditions have made it impossible for 
people to live in the rural countryside. The real question that needs to be asked is: what 
32. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. “Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia”, Modern 
Asian Studies, 31, 3 (1997), 735-762; Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels, Southeast Asia in Global Contex, c. 800 – 1830, 
vols 1 and 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 and 2010).
33. Peter Frankopan, The Silk Roads, A New History of the World (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).
34. Charles West ed. “Religious exemption in Pre-Modern Eurasia, c. 300 – 1300 CE,” Medieval Worlds, 6 (2017).
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kept people in the countryside before the mid-twentieth century? We need to recognize 
that people stayed on their land not because they lived in hermeneutic localities, cut off 
from the globalizing world. Rather, they lived in an already global world. Until relatively 
recently, distant connections were a resource that helped produce local rootedness. We 
need to understand why that was true then and no longer true now.
Julia McClure: I think our focus on poverty in the work that we are doing through the 
poverty research network and in our own studies will be an important contribution to the 
field of global history as it undergoes ‘the inequality turn’. As global inequality continues 
to increase, global historians have an increasing obligation to explain the making of 
our unequal world, and understanding the dynamics of poverty will be an important 
part of this project. Global history’s ‘poverty turn’ will also be a call to radicalise our 
methodologies within global history, to incorporate social history, and to produce global 
history from the bottom up. It will also require sharper analysis of power, from economic, 
legal, cultural, and political perspectives to understand how pathways towards inequality 
have been legitimated and how poverty has been normalised and weaponised. Focusing 
on poverty, within the framework of inequality, also offers opportunities to understand 
the history of resistance. The strategies that have been successful as well as those that 
have failed. 
Norberto Ferreras: Mostly, when we think about global history we are thinking 
about the history of capitalism, and when I say periphery – I use the term ironically, of 
course, because there are not ‘cores’ and ‘peripheries’: each part depends on the other, 
and from this point of view are interdependent. Brazil during the nineteenth century, 
was the core of a network of slavery,  merchandise, and capital. Identifying this core 
region as a periphery indicates the historic inequalities that have been engendered by 
the history of capitalism. The basis of capitalism is to create inequalities. For example, 
on chapter twenty-five of Das Capital, Marx analysed colonisation relationships, and he 
presents a beautiful example of the difficulties of translating capitalism to peripheries 
or to the colonies. This is the case of Mr Peel, an entrepreneur, who tried to colonize 
New Holland (Perth in Western Australia). He brought everything to Swan River 
(downtown Perth). He brought machines, seeds, and workers, but it was impossible to 
translate the relations of production. The Swan River region had plenty of land, and 
Mr. Peel’s workers preferred to live on their own, leaving their master. The Swan River 
had plenty of land and workers preferred to carry on their own production. Without 
workers there isn’t capitalism. As Brazil needed to become capitalist, therefore it 
needed to separate workers from land and their means of production. And this took a 
great effort, which continues today. Inequality is the base of Capital, and so we need 
to put inequality as one of the most important categories to be analysed. Furthermore, 
globalisation and the history of capitalism are entangled. From Polanyi to Pomeranz, 
and from Sanjay Subrahmanyan to Osterhammel, global historians have been studying 
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the history of capitalism, but they didn’t pay enough attention to inequality as the key 
issue of capitalism. I didn’t see yet one book about globalisation outside of capitalism. 
Julia McClure: Thank you Norberto for these insights which raise questions about 
the way global history has often been written about the history of capitalism. It is very 
interesting to think about the question of globalisation from outside capitalism. I have 
often thought about this in relation to the history of the Franciscan Order, which became, 
arguably, the first global religious order, and emerged as a resistance movement against 
the spread of money and markets. They often travelled with merchants, following world 
trade routes, but they continued to question the relationship between economic values and 
spiritual values and to criticise cultures of accumulation. For me, following the history 
of the Franciscan Order has been a small opening to think about alternative narratives of 
global history, and this in fact led me to my current research on the role of poverty in the 
making of the modern world. This panel has been a great opportunity to think about the 
different directions that global histories of poverty and inequality can take us.  
I want to finish by thanking all participants for their contributions, which have 
indicated the different ways that discussions on inequality can lead future directions in 
global history. These inequalities are not only economic, but also political, legal, and 
epistemological. Thinking about inequality helps us as global historians to resist trends 
towards the homogenisation or universalisation of certain epistemological categories and 
world views. Our aims as global historians must be to capture the lost visions of the 
world and value systems that are being erased by the continued spread of capitalism 
and neoliberalism that are penetrating all institutions, including the institutional sites of 
knowledge production. As we live in an unequal world our role as global historians is 
to explain how we arrived here, and the alternative ways of living, social relations, and 
relations with the environment, that have been lost along the way. 
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